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Background: Performance measures are often neglected during the transition period of national health insurance
scheme implementation in many low and middle income countries. These measurements evaluate the extent to
which various aspects of the schemes meet their key objectives. This study assesses the implementation of a health
insurance scheme using optimal resource use domains and examines possible factors that influence each domain,
according to providers’ perspectives.
Methods: A retrospective, cross-sectional survey was done between August and December 2010 in Kaduna state,
and 466 health care provider personnel were interviewed. Optimal-resource-use was defined in four domains: provider
payment mechanism (capitation and fee-for-service payment methods), benefit package, administrative efficiency, and
active monitoring mechanism. Logistic regression analysis was used to identify provider factors that may influence each
domain.
Results: In the provider payment mechanism domain, capitation payment method (95%) performed better than
fee-for-service payment method (62%). Benefit package domain performed strongly (97%), while active monitoring
mechanism performed weakly (37%). In the administrative efficiency domain, both promptness of referral system (80%)
and prompt arrival of funds (93%) performed well. At the individual level, providers with fewer enrolees encountered
difficulties with reimbursement. Other factors significantly influenced each of the optimal-resource-use domains.
Conclusions: Fee-for-service payment method and claims review, in the provider payment and active monitoring
mechanisms, respectively, performed weakly according to the providers’ (at individual-level) perspectives. A short-fall
on the supply-side of health insurance could lead to a direct or indirect adverse effect on the demand-side of the
scheme. Capitation payment per enrolees should be revised to conform to economic circumstances. Performance
indicators and providers’ characteristics and experiences associated with resource use can assist policy makers to
monitor and evaluate health insurance implementation.
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National health insurance schemes (NHIS) are implemented
as part of health reform and as strategies aimed towards
providing effective and efficient health care for citizens in
many low and middle income countries (LMICs). Some
LMICs are still in the early stages of implementation, while* Correspondence: donghj@zju.edu.cn
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumothers are in the middle and late stages. Despite challenges
in implementation, most LMICs such as Nigeria, India, and
Kenya have increased government spending as a percentage
of total health expenditure (THE) between 1 and 3 per-
centage points [1]. Ghana, Rwanda, and Indonesia have
increased THE between 5 and 10 percentage points after
launching reforms [1]. The incremental approach to risk
pooling, used by most LMICs, commences with multiple
pools for different target populations [1].
In Nigeria, health insurance was introduced to the citizens
in mid-2005. Presently, revenue for implementation of thentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited.
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general government revenues, despite the challenges of
tax collection [1]. The formal-sector programme is paid
for with funds created by pooling the contributions of
employees and employers [2]. Contributions to the pro-
gram are 15% of the employee’s basic salary, with the
employee contributing 5% and employers contributing
the remaining 10% [2-4]. Nigeria has adopted the incre-
mental approach of risk pooling, using multiple stages
which would later incorporate other population groups
in different NHIS programs [1]. Purchasing services,
in the NHIS, is accomplished through a mix of public
and private providers who are reimbursed by purchasing-
agency resources controlled by health management orga-
nizations (Hmos).
There have been virtually no in-depth studies in low,
middle and high income countries that deal with the
performance evaluation of health insurance using optimal-
resource-use (ORU) domains. The performance of health
insurance schemes, which begins to dominate health care
financing in LMICs, demands greater attention in the con-
temporary context. Fundamental and structural problems
associated with ORU domains need to be understood, and
effective solutions proffered. LMICs would benefit from
common, comparable standards for measuring performance
of schemes related to ORU, either across countries or across
regions within a country, which could guide midcourse
policy corrections and improve implementation [1].
NHIS performance measures and their indicators are
instrumental in assisting policy and decision makers in
identifying target groups, clarifying objectives, defining
measures of performance, and developing performance
information systems [5]. These performance measures
include revenue collection, pooling and purchasing in terms
of ORU [1,6-11]. Presently, there is a lack of evidence in
LMICs to evaluate the performance of health insurance
using optimal-resource-use as an outcome measure.
Furthermore, little is known on how to evaluate this
optimal-resource-use.
ORU is a health financing target used to evaluate how
well social health insurance performs [6,7]. The WHO has
proposed the model of optimal-resource-use domains to
monitor and evaluate the performance of health insurance
schemes during the transition period of implementation
[6-11], but evidence from in-depth investigations in LMICs
is still lacking. These ORU domains encompass admin-
istrative efficiency, active monitoring mechanism, provider
payment mechanisms, and benefit package inclusions
[6-11]. ORU domains of health insurance schemes accen-
tuate the importance of monitoring and evaluation, but
the appraisals are usually not known, and the suitability
and practicality have not yet been explored and examined.
Moreover, the supply-side of a health insurance system
and its influencing factors and characteristics are mostlyneglected. Implementers, policy and decision makers should
understand the key characteristics and potential factors
influencing the insurance supply-side to improve the
schemes’ implementation.
This paper examines the performance of Nigeria’s NHIS
related to ORU domains based on providers’ experiences.
Moreover, the paper addresses the key characteristics and
potential issues challenging the Nigeria’s NHIS imple-
mentation according to the providers’ perspectives. As
this study is exploratory in nature, we hypothesized that
the ORU domains ratings would be influenced by certain
provider personnel experiences and associated charac-
teristics at individual level. These hypotheses and related
assumptions are supported by the theoretical framework
of performance indicators for the implementation of social
health insurance and related literatures [3,4,6,7,12,13].
This study was carried out to evaluate the progress of im-
plementation of the health insurance scheme related to
ORU domains.Methods
Study setting
This retrospective cross-sectional study was conducted
in Kaduna state between August and December 2010.
The state is located in the central region of Nigeria, which
borders the federal capital territory (Abuja). Kaduna state
was chosen because it has one of the highest numbers of
providers’ health facilities (N = 116) out of the country’s
total number (N = 2646) accredited to provide both primary
and secondary healthcare in the NHIS at the time of the
study, as identified by the NHIS regulatory agency. Most of
the health facilities in the state have been accredited since
the inception of the NHIS in Nigeria.Sampling
A two-stage sampling procedure was used to select the
study participants. We employed simple random sam-
pling at each stage to reduce selection bias. The first
stage involved selecting only 68 health facilities that
were accredited by the NHIS in the three years preced-
ing the survey (NHIS 2010 regional office data, Kaduna).
The second stage involved the random selection of 509
provider personnel that were actively involved in health
insurance activities for at least three years in the ran-
domly selected health facilities. This sampling was pro-
portionally distributed across the selected health facilities
based on number of personnel working within the health
facility. Verification of the health facilities was carried out
in collaboration with the NHIS regional officers in Kaduna
and NHIS headquarters in Abuja-Nigeria. Four hundred
and sixty-six provider personnel from 57 accredited health
facilities were interviewed, and this was done to ensure
facility-size representation at individual level.
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A pre-tested interviewer-administered questionnaire was
used. The questionnaire consisted of two sections: (i)
personal characteristics of each provider (at individual
level) related to the optimal-resource-use of the insurance
scheme and (ii) information on the evaluated outcome
of health insurance performance including types of optimal-
resource-use domains as rated by the respondents. This
structured questionnaire was designed to particularly
address the study objectives. The questionnaire was pilot
tested on ten respondents from 10 health facilities. Further-
more, the questionnaire was field-tested five times prior
to this study. Following pilot-testing, minor modifications
were made to the questionnaire, including revisions to the
sequence and phrasing of some questions to make them
clearer to understand. The detailed explanation of the var-
iables and their measurements used in the questionnaire
are presented below. In order to enhance clarity and limit
misinterpretation of terms by the respondents, question-
naire manuals, defining various key terms and optimal-
resource-use domains, were incorporated as addenda
for the participants (see Table 1). The questionnaire
was administered to the providers at individual level. ToTable 1 Synopsis of definitions related to “optimal-resource-u
Domain name Variable used
Administrative efficiency Prompt arrival of insurance fun
Promptness of the referral syst
Active monitoring mechanism Claims review (as a proxy)
Provider payment mechanism Capitation payment method
Fee-for-service payment metho
Benefit package Benefit package inclusion
*Abbreviations: Hmos health management organizations, NHIS national health insura
Sources: NHIS [2]; NHIS [3,4]; Carrin and James [6-8].provide a more constructive explanation of outcome and
explanatory variables, we caution that the use of indicators,
to judge performance of insurance schemes related to
ORU, requires a clear understanding of the organizational
structure, operational arrangements of the system, suit-
ability for purpose and context, and caveats about inter-
pretation. In this study, the variables were primarily
generated according to the insurance scheme in Nigeria
contextually. The literature identifies an unmet need for
a rigorous means of selecting indicators according to
suitability for purpose and use contextually [14].
Explanatory variables
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked, “Which pro-
fessional category of health provider relating to assigned
duties and responsibilities do you belong to?” including
doctor, nurse, pharmacist, record officer, and other admin-
istrative staff [4,13]. The responses on type of facility and
number of enrolees [4,13], were obtained from both the
providers and NHIS official records (see Table 2). Respon-
dents were asked how often they interact or have contact
with enrolees seeking health care [13], including the last
1 month, and also the last 12 months. Responses to eachse” domains by the providers
Definition (provided in the interview manual)
ds Regular monthly reimbursement of capitation payment
made by the Hmos* to the health facilities or hospitals,
and fee-for-service payment in case of referral.
em Efficient and rapid (24 hours) response of the Hmos* to
the health care provider, when patients are to be referred
for secondary or tertiary care in the insurance scheme.
Monthly cross-checking that enrolees received all necessary
treatments and diagnostic tests covered by the health
insurance and all prescribed drugs that are included in
the NHIS* drug list.
Total monthly amount of money (fixed per enrolee)
received by the health provider or hospital from the Hmos*.
This total fixed sum excludes payments for referrals and
10% of total cost of drugs paid already by the patient
during hospital visit.
d This is termed an amount of money reimbursed by the
Hmos to the health provider facility or hospital per episode
of specialty, secondary or tertiary care administered to the
enrolee. This amount of money excludes payments for
capitation and 10% of total cost of drugs paid already by
the patient during hospital visit.
Includes all treatments and diagnostic tests covered by
the health insurance plus all drugs prescribed by doctors or
nurses as included in the NHIS* drug list. This benefit
package includes out-patient care, in-patient care,
specialized care (eye and dental care), and prescribed
medications and consumables. However there are
exclusions such as dialysis, cancer treatment, mental
disorders, branded medications and ostentatious
consumables (as specified by the regulatory agency).
nce scheme.
Table 2 Characteristics and experiences of HCPs* to investigate health insurance optimal-resource-use activities
Independent variables Categories Number Percentage
Total cases 466 100%
Providers profession1 Medical 293 63%
Non-medical 173 37%
Type of facility Public 281 60%
Private 185 40%
Number of enrolees in providers* facility 1000 or less 63 14%
More than 1000 403 86%
Last 1 month contact with enrolees by providers Weekly 389 85%
Every two weeks 77 15%
Last 12 months contact with enrolees by providers Weekly 395 83%
Every two weeks 71 17%
Improvement in waiting times of enrolees Yes 370 79%
No 96 21%
Providers received enrolees* list quarterly2 Yes 324 70%
No 142 30%
Facility inspection in the last 12 months3 ≤2 times 377 81%
>2 times 89 19%
Overall annual inspection3 Yes 142 30%
No 324 70%
Providers 12 months contact with referral Monthly 213 46%
≥2 months 253 54%
12 months availability of insurance funds Monthly 366 79%
Every four months 100 21%
3 years availability of insurance funds Monthly 370 79%
Every four months 96 21%
Information on full entitlement made available by NHIS* Agree 119 26%
Disagree 347 74%
Health insurance to revise capitation payment4 Agreed 435 93%
Disagree 31 7%
Overall capitation payment amounts ratings Good 339 73%
Bad 127 27%
*Abbreviations: NHIS national health insurance scheme regulatory agency.
1Profession means the assigned duties and responsibilities of providers. Again, non-medical is administration personnel including record officers with no medical
responsibility, but involved in resource use activities.
2Quarterly means every three months of a year instalmentally.
3Inspection means quality assurance checks of providers’ activities conducted by external monitors.
4Providers opinion on capitation payment per enrolee to be revised by the NHIS regulatory agency.
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weeks” which were included in the questionnaire. This
interaction indicates the extent to which the respondent is
connected to the enrolees and exposure to resource use
activities [4,13].
To investigate the providers’ previous experiences,
respondents were asked whether there were improved
waiting times to see the doctor or nurse (as perceived
by the providers) [4,13], receive enrollee lists quarterly and
overall annual inspection of their activities. The responsesto each of these items were dichotomized “Yes” and
“No” which was included in the questionnaire. Relating to
frequency of inspection [3,4], respondents were further
asked how many times they were inspected by the health
insurance regulatory monitors in the last 12 months.
Responses to this item ranged between “none”, “1 to 2
times”, “3 to 4 times”, “5 to 6 times”, and “At least 7 times”.
However, in our analysis, this response was converted
into 2 categories of “At most 2 times” and “More than
2 times”. This frequency indicates the extent to which
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the insurance scheme [4,13]. Concerning referral, respon-
dents were asked how often they interact or deal with
activities of referring enrolees/patients for secondary
or tertiary care [12]. Responses to this item ranged between
“Monthly”, “Every 2 months”, “Every 3 months”, “Every
4 months”, and “At least every 5 months”. Again, in our
analysis, this response was converted into 2 categories
of “Monthly” and “At least every 2 months”. Regarding
availability of funds, respondents were asked how often
insurance funds are made available, including the last
12 months, and also the last 3 years. The responses to
each of these items were dichotomized “Monthly” and
“Every 4 months”. There is an inconsistent variation of
insurance funding available to the providers [3,4]. Respon-
dents were asked their concerns and opinions about the
availability of information on full entitlements, their desire
for the health insurance scheme to review capitation
payments to ensure good quality service, and the overall
ratings of capitation payment amounts [4,13].
Outcome variables
In the questionnaire, the outcome variables (see Table 3)
include providers’ rated measures of ORU domains. Our
study is supporting the theoretical framework of per-
formance indicators for NHIS implementation [6,7].
Table 1 presents a synopsis of definitions related to optimal-
resource-use domains (also provided in the interview man-
ual) used during the study. All questions that were asked
on ORU domains are related to the definitions in Table 1.
Administrative efficiency was determined by prompt ar-
rival of insurance funds and promptness of the referral
system [2-4,6,7]. Respondents were asked, “Overall, how
would you rate the prompt arrival of insurance funds?”,
and “Overall, how would you rate the promptness of
referral system within the insurance scheme?”. Active
monitoring mechanism was derived using review of
claims (as a proxy) [2-4,6,7]. The respondents were asked,
“Overall, how would you rate claims review done by the
regulatory monitors in the last 12 months?” Provider
payment mechanism was characterized as capitation and
fee-for-service (in the case of referrals) payment methodsTable 3 Types of optimal-resource-use domains* as rated by
Domains Variables
Administrative efficiency Promptness of referral system
Prompt arrival of insurance funds
Active monitoring mechanism Claims review
Provider payment mechanism Capitation payment method
Fee-for-service payment method
Benefit package Benefit package inclusions
*The definitions and measurements of optimal-resource-use domains and variables[2-4,6,7]. Here, respondents were asked, “In general, how
would you rate the capitation payment method during the
last 12 months?”, and “In general, how would you rate the
fee-for-service payment method for referral during the last
12 months?” Benefit package inclusion was defined as
all treatment and diagnostic tests covered by the health
insurance [2-4,6,7]. Again, the respondents were asked,
“Overall, how would you rate all the treatment and tests
covered by the insurance in form of benefit package?”
All the responses to each of these items ranged between
“very good”, “good”, “moderate”, “bad”, and “very bad”.
Measures and data analysis
The variables of ORU domains were measured using
Likert-type items of five ordered categories, rated from
one (very good) to five (very bad). These ordered categor-
ies were transformed, summated and the responses con-
verted into 2 categories of one (good) and two (Bad), as
presented in Table 3. We employed the “observational
model” and generated the cut-off threshold based on
distribution of responses [15-21]. The McNemar and
marginal homogeneity tests that were used emphasized
the comparison of the distributions [15,16,18,22]. The
categories of “very good” and “good” were termed as one
(good), while the “moderate”, “bad”, and “very bad” were
termed as two (bad). This conversion was carried out be-
cause the resultant binary variables reflected a meaningful
distinction in practical terms [15-21].
The list of explanatory variables is shown in Table 2.
The explanatory variables were selected according to the
study hypotheses. We tested for collinearities and elimi-
nated only one variable with a correlation above 0.75.
The eliminated variable was “Last 1 month contact with
enrolees by providers”. It strongly correlated with “Last
12 months contact with enrolees by providers”. We kept
the variable “Last 12 months contact with enrolees by
providers” because of its relevance to the study since
health insurance aimed to promote utilization of health
services. Moreover, this variable would provide better
additional information on the providers’ experiences with
the insurance scheme. We analysed each of the explana-
tory and ORU domain variable as a dichotomous category.the providers’ respondents (n = 466)
Provider’s ratings; N (%)
Bad Percent Good Percent
92 20% 374 80%
33 7% 433 93%
293 63% 173 37%
22 5% 444 95%
177 38% 289 62%
14 3% 452 97%
by the providers are presented in Table 1 and the method section.
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factors associated with the ORU. Stepwise selection using
backward procedure was applied to identify the associations
in the multiple logistic regression. Our reasons for this
approach were that, (i) this is the first in-depth research
study that investigated ORU domains of the NHIS based
on providers experiences within LMICs context practically,
(ii) we are investigating and quantifying the most relevant
perceived providers’ (individual level) factors which are
potentially associated with the resource use activities, and
(iii) that these results should be empirically interpreted.
Furthermore, the final decision on which indicators were
candidates for removal from the model was largely de-
termined by the context. We reasonably considered the
relevant model specifications and assumptions at various
stages of the statistical analyses [23,24]. Associations
between the outcome and explanatory variables were
assessed using odds ratios, 95% confidence intervals and
probability values. A p-value of 0.05 was used as the
threshold for statistical significance. The list of independ-
ent variables is shown in Table 2, and outcomes in Table 3.
The STATA program (STATA® 12.1, 2011; StataCorp LP.,
4905 Lakeway Drive, College Station, Texas, 77845 USA)
was used to carry out the analyses.
This study protocol was approved by the Ethics Com-
mission of Heidelberg University-Germany [S-035/2009],
University Research Ethics Committee ABU-Nigeria [VC/
P. 18890] and the NHIS Headquarters Abuja-Nigeria
[NHIS-467].
Results
Providers’ characteristics and experiences related to health
insurance resource use activities
Interviewees and their facilities needed to be accredited
as providers and actively involved in health insurance
activities of the NHIS for at least three years. Among
the 509 providers’ personnel from the 68 health facilities
requested to participate, 466 providers from 57 health
facilities responded. Here, at the first stage sampling of
accredited health facilities, we achieved 83.8% response
rate, while at the second stage of sampling provider
personnel we achieved 91.6% response rate.
Of the 466 providers’ personnel included in this study,
60% were public providers and 40% were private providers,
presented in Table 2. Most of the providers were from
health facilities with at least 1000 enrolees registered in
the scheme. Providers’ personnel mostly had contact with
enrolees in the last month preceding the survey. Most of
the providers reported that waiting times for outpatient
care had improved. By contrast, only 30% of the providers
reported that overall inspection was conducted annually.
The majority of providers reported that insurance funds
were mostly available during the last 12 months and
3 years, respectively. This was done to assess consistencyand disparity during the period. A reasonable minority
of the providers (26%) reported that information on full
entitlement was provided. Most of the providers (93%)
agreed that capitation payment per enrolee should be
revised by the NHIS regulatory agency.
Performance of optimal-resource-use domains evaluated
by providers according to their perspectives
The evaluated optimal-resource-use domains and provider
responses are presented in Table 3. In the administrative
efficiency domain, both “promptness of the referral system”
and “prompt arrival of insurance funds” were rated “good”,
80% and 93%, respectively, by the providers. The active
monitoring mechanism (claims review) was considered
“bad” (63%) by the providers. In the provider payment
mechanisms, capitation payment method was rated highly
(95%), but the fee-for-service payment method was only
rated “good” at 62 percent. The benefit package inclusion
was rated nearly unanimously as “good” (97%).
Providers’ characteristics and experiences associated with
the insurance optimal-resource-use domains
The results in this section were obtained using multiple
logistic regression models and are presented in Table 4.
Respondents’ characteristics and functions associated with
the insurance optimal-resource-use domains are depicted
in relation to the NHIS implementation strategies. In
the administrative efficiency domain, providers with lower
numbers of enrolees were less likely to report prompt ar-
rival of insurance funds (reimbursement) to their facilities
(OR = 0.28, 95% CI 0.11 – 0.68). However, providers with
12 months and 3 years funds availability were more likely
to have better reimbursement to their health facilities
(OR = 3.50, 95% CI 1.46 – 8.36 and OR = 2.43, 95% CI
1.02 – 5.89, respectively). Regarding promptness of the
referral system, the most important associated factor
was overall annual inspection. Providers that underwent
annual inspections of their health facilities were more
likely to report better promptness of the referral system in
the NHIS than those with no annual inspection (P <0.0001,
OR = 4.42, 95% CI 2.02 – 9.68).
The ranking of response variables based on their strength
of association with the active monitoring mechanism, in
descending order was: “information on full entitlement
provided by NHIS” (P <0.0001), “capitation payment per
enrolee to be revised by the NHIS” (P <0.0001), “number of
enrolees in the providers facility” (P = 0.01), and “providers
received enrolees list quarterly” (P = 0.05). Providers with
fewer enrolees, and those that received the information on
full entitlement which was provided by the NHIS, were
more likely to report better claims review. However,
providers who regularly received enrolee lists, and were of
the opinion to revise the capitation payment per enrolee,
were less likely to report better insurance claims.
Table 4 Multiple logistic regression analyses of providers characteristics and experiences (at individual level) in rel to optimal-resource-use domains
Administrative
efficiency
Active monitoring
mechanisms
Provi yment
me isms
Benefit package
Prompt arrival of
insurance funds
Promptness of
referral system
Claims
review
Capitation
payment
Fee-for-service
payment
Benefit package
inclusions
P-value OR (95% CI) P-value OR (95% CI) P-value OR (95% CI) P-value OR (95% C -value OR (95% CI) P-value OR (95% CI)
Providers profession 0.05
Non-medical Ref.
Medical 1.67 1.02 2.78
Number of enrolees in providers facility 0.005 0.01
>1000 Ref Ref
≤1000 0.28 0.11 0.68 2.40 1.20 4.80
12-month contacts with enrolees .014 0.008
Every 2 weeks ef. Ref.
Weekly .46 0.25 0.85 4.48 1.47 13.68
Improved waiting times of enrolees 0.03 0.03 0.002
No Ref. Ref. Ref.
Yes 2.47 1.07 5.69 1.81 1.05 3.11 5.53 1.84 16.59
Receive enrolees list quarterly 0.05
No Ref.
Yes 0.55 0.32 0.98
Overall annual inspection <0.0001 0.0001
No Ref. ef.
Yes 4.42 2.02 9.68 .37 2.57 7.43
12-month contact with referral 0.005
≥ 2 months Ref.
Monthly 2.13 1.25 3.63
12-month funds available 0.005
Every 4 months Ref.
Monthly 3.50 1.46 8.36
3-year funds available 0.05 0.031
Every 4 months Ref. Ref.
Monthly 2.43 1.02 5.89 2.71 1.10 6.
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Table 4 Multiple logistic regression analyses of providers characteristics and experiences (at individual level) in relation to optimal-resource-use domains
(Continued)
Information on entitlement available <0.0001 <0.0001
Disagree Ref. Ref.
Agree 82.99 37.46 183.85 4.63 2.56 8.36
NHIS to revise capitation payment <0.0001 0.004
Disagree Ref. Ref.
Agree 0.15 0.06 0.35 0.16 0.05 0.57
Providers ratings of capitation amounts 0.002 0.002 <0.0001
Bad Ref. Ref. Ref.
Good 3.40 1.55 7.47 2.22 1.34 3.69 7.13 2.70 18.86
n 466 466 466 466 466 466
R2 0.213 0.118 0.424 0.142 0.161 0.123
Model test: LR χ2 50.74; p < 0.001 54.55; p < 0.001 260.41; p < 0.001 25.23; p < 0.001 99.53; p < 0.001 15.46; p < 0.001
log likelihood −93.81 −204.24 −177.17 −76.024 −259.65 −55.13
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capitation and fee-for-service (in case of referral) payment
methods. Providers with three years fund availability in
their facility (OR = 2.71, 95% CI 1.10 – 6.68) and those
with good ratings of their capitation payment amounts
(OR = 7.13, 95% CI 2.70 – 18.86) were more likely to report
better capitation payment method. The ranking of response
variables based on their strength of association with
the fee-for-service payment method, in descending order
was: “information on full entitlement provided by the
NHIS” (P <0.0001), “overall inspection of providers activ-
ities was conducted annually” (P <0.0001), “capitation pay-
ment per enrolee to be revised by the NHIS” (P <0.004),
and “providers twelve months contact with the enrolees”
(P <0.014). Providers with regular annual inspection of
their health facilities and those that indicated the infor-
mation on full entitlement was provided by the NHIS
were more likely to report better fee-for-service payment
method in the insurance scheme. By contrast, providers’
who regularly had contact with the enrolees, and those
advocating for a revision of the capitation payment per
enrolee, were more likely to report poor fee-for-service
payment procedures in the NHIS.
Providers’ twelve months contact with the enrolees
was positively associated with the benefit package do-
main (OR = 4.48, 95% CI 1.47 – 13.68). Providers who
regularly had contact with the enrolees were more likely
to report better benefit package inclusion in the insurance
scheme.Discussion
Considering the supply-side of a health insurance system
has direct and indirect effects on the demand-side of the
system, evaluating performance of the NHIS using ORU
according to providers’ perspectives is relevant during
implementation, and could stimulate the need for reform.
This study aimed to assess the performance of the health
insurance program using optimal-resource-use (ORU)
based on providers’ perspectives. We demonstrated that
ORU domains were useful in evaluating the performance
of health insurance schemes during implementation. Our
study corroborates the importance of these ORU domains
and provides support to the theoretical framework of per-
formance indicators for the implementation of national
health insurance schemes in LMICs [6,7]. To our know-
ledge, this is the first practical in-depth study to approach
the investigation of ORU domains based on providers’
perspectives, and methodological points of view in the
context of NHIS performance evaluation in LMICs.
Considering the exploratory nature of this study, we fur-
ther examined providers’ characteristics and concerns
related to ORU of the insurance scheme based on their
experiences.Stakeholders on the supply-side of the insurance system,
particularly providers and Hmos (insurers), are the most
relevant and specific target-groups to evaluate the per-
formance of health insurance related to ORU. We iden-
tified weaknesses of the fee-for-service payment method
and of claims review in the provider payment and active
monitoring mechanisms, respectively. The NHIS regula-
tory agency should consider appropriate reform measures
to deal with these shortcomings in the scheme. In 2005,
Carrin and James argued that the most important key
factors affecting the transition of NHIS implementation
is the system’s ability to adequately administer and manage
the insurance [8].
Administrative efficiency
Administrative efficiency was investigated in our study
using two proxies, including prompt arrival of insurance
funds and promptness of the referral system in the NHIS.
The most interesting finding was that promptness of the
referral system performed poorer than prompt arrival of
insurance funds to providers in the insurance Scheme. A
possible explanation for this might be delaying administra-
tive procedures and payments for referrals in the NHIS.
Recent studies have explained that late reimbursement
of insurance funds to providers results in administrative
inefficiency, which is dependent on administrative ex-
penditure [25]. By promoting maximum cost recovery,
the providers are motivated to function efficiently to
remain within their predetermined budgets. In addition,
these funds might be utilized more effectively to provide
quality services to the clients. Nevertheless, it would be
inappropriate to equate the observed optimal-resource-use
with low administrative efficiency and delayed referral in
the system [7,25]. Simple and affordable administrative
protocols might be used to restructure the referral system
procedures by the regulatory agency.
Providers with fewer enrolees encountered difficulties
with reimbursement which caused poor administrative ef-
ficiency, according to our findings. In this study, availabil-
ity of insurance funds and capitation amounts acquired by
the providers might have augmented the providers rating
of prompt arrival of insurance funds. This result may
be explained in that providers with better availability of
insurance funds and also acquired capitation amounts in
their facilities were likely to be promptly reimbursed in
the insurance scheme.
In our study, the NHIS referral system was found to
be less administratively efficient than the insurance reim-
bursement, according to the providers. The results indicate
that the higher the scores are for improved waiting times
and inspection of the providers, the better the promptness
of the referral system. These findings suggest that regular
inspection of providers might possibly assist in preventing
delays in referrals of the NHIS.
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The active monitoring mechanism was poorly rated
by the providers, according to our findings. A possible ex-
planation for this might be that monitoring mechanisms
such as patient appeals, peer-review committees and
active claim reviews were not fully established in the
NHIS. The presence of a claims review process ensures
that insurance claims are independently reviewed by
appropriate personnel and that claims made by healthcare
providers are justified [7,26]. The NHIS should adopt
peer-review committees, not fully planned in the scheme,
and reactivate the claims reviews that might help improve
the active monitoring mechanism during implementation.
This study found the fewer the number of enrolees with
the providers, the better the claims review. However, a
possible explanation could be that providers who are over-
crowded with enrolees tend to have difficulties with the
claims review, which might in turn lead to negative effects
on the monitoring mechanism of the insurance scheme.
This study demonstrates that better availability of informa-
tion on full entitlement, leads to a better active monitoring
mechanism in the insurance scheme. The findings also re-
vealed that negative consequences due to poor capitation
payment resulted in a negative effect on the claims review.
In 2000, Mills et al. cautioned the drawback of capitation
payment is that insurance controls costs by transferring the
risk to the health care providers [13].
Provider payment mechanism
Capitation payment is the most common method that
is used to pay providers in the NHIS of Nigeria. A most
interesting finding was that providers supported the
capitation payment method more than fee-for-service
(FFS) payment method. Although each payment mechan-
ism has its relative strengths and weaknesses, revising these
methods may encourage the providers to provide appro-
priate healthcare to their patients [7]. Conceptually, the
capitation method is expected to encourage underproduc-
tion and the FFS method to promote overproduction of
health care services in insurance schemes. Studies have
suggested that insurance schemes could achieve better
performance through integrated referral systems with ef-
fective monitoring [7]. Another important finding was that
providers who received insurance funds regularly, favored
the capitation payment method. This observation provides
further evidence that the capitation method likely en-
courages providers’ underproduction of healthcare services
in the NHIS [7]. Moreover, distortion of government-set
prices which are lower than the real costs, gives lower in-
centives for providers that may result in under-utilization
of health services by clients [27].
The FFS payment method is applied to the referral
system of the NHIS in Nigeria, because patients’ referrals
to secondary or tertiary levels of care are paid by the FFSmethod. Our findings revealed that providers who had
relatively more contact with the enrolees rated the FFS
method poorer than those who had less contact with
the enrolees. This is evidence that providers are either
displeased or encountered obstacle with the FFS method
during patients’ referrals. A further possible explanation
might be that the FFS method discouraged providers to
further refer patients in the insurance scheme. This may
suggest that regular inspection in the NHIS might facilitate
appreciation of the FFS method by identifying and resolving
providers’ impediments. Moreover, if the capitation pay-
ment is revised and the FFS method restructured by the
NHIS regulatory agency, then the providers’ motivation
and patients’ utilization of health care services might
improve in the insurance scheme.
Benefit package inclusion
The benefit package inclusion was rated highest among
all ORU domains by the providers, according to our
findings. Recent studies have explained that better perform-
ance of insurance schemes is associated with evidence that
the benefit package is comprehensive and in accordance
with society’s preferences, so that resources are best utilized
[7]. We found that regular contact of providers with
enrolees positively influenced their rating of the NHIS
benefit package. Several studies have revealed that better
provider-client interactions have an effect on the benefit
package and the availability of the full benefit package
improves these interactions [5-8,28]. However, some
studies have suggested that the benefit package could
be incrementally developed according to the scheme’s
ability to pay [28], changing needs, values and economic
circumstances [5-8]. Countries such as South Korea,
Singapore and Thailand have experienced the incremental
development of benefit packages [28] to improve perform-
ance of their insurance schemes. Moreover, this approach
has been supported by the World Health Organization
and the World Bank [29-31].
The results of this study should be interpreted consid-
ering its limitations. First, the performance evaluation
of health insurance using ORU, according to providers’
perspectives, might not comprehensively conform to soci-
etal perspectives. However, problems on the supply-side of
the insurance scheme have the tendency to negatively affect
the demand-side, leading to unintended consequences.
Second, because of its cross-sectional design, the associ-
ations identified here do not imply causality. Third, the
possible dependence of responses by facility was a limita-
tion of the present study. However, when the clustering
effect was taken into account in the logistic regression
models, the estimates were practically identical. For in-
stance, the estimated OR for prompt arrival of insurance
funds by ratings of capitation amounts changed from 3.40
(95% CI 1.55 – 7.47) to 3.40 (95% CI 1.62 – 7.13). For the
Mohammed et al. BMC Health Services Research 2014, 14:127 Page 11 of 12
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/127sake of simplicity and the perceptions of individuals, esti-
mates were reported without considering this clustering
effect. Future research may explore opportunities to study
ORU with more focus on the facility level, to account for
the multi-level nature of the system. Further similar stud-
ies should be conducted across Nigeria and other LMICs
to explore regional differences and variations related to
NHIS periodic performance.Conclusions
Fee-for-service payment method and claims review, in the
provider payment and active monitoring mechanisms,
respectively, performed weakly according to the providers’
(at individual-level) perspectives. This might not com-
prehensively conform to societal perspectives. However,
problems on the supply-side of the insurance scheme
have the tendency to negatively affect the demand-side,
leading to unintended consequences. Among several pro-
viders’ characteristics and experiences which significantly
influenced ORU, it seems relevant that providers with
fewer enrolees encountered particular difficulties with
reimbursement. The capitation payment per enrolee should
be revised to conform to economic circumstances. Periodic
identification of providers’ characteristics and experiences
that influence ORU can assist in guiding policy and imple-
mentation of reforms.Competing interests
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